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ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-FIFTH MEETING

THE UNIVERSITY
OF MICHIGAN

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COLLECTION

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 17 March 1964, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. M. ZEMLA

(Czechoslovakia)

64-08251

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. E. HOSANNAH

Bulgaria:

Mr. K. LUKANOV

Mr. G. GHELEV

Mr. D. TEKHOV

Mr. G. YANKOV

Burma:

Mr. James BARRINGTON

U HTOON SHEIN

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS

Mr. S.F. RAE

Mr. R.M. TAIT

Mr. P.D. LEE

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. M. ZEMLA

Mr. T. LAHODA

Mr. J. BUCEK

Mr. V. VAJNAR

Ethiopia:

Ato A. AGEDE

Ato S. TEFERRA

India:

Mr. V.C. TRIVEDI

Mr. A.S. MEHTA

Mr. K. KRISHNA RAO

Mr. G.R. SAPRA

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI

Mr. E. GUIDOTTI

Mr. S. AVETTA

Mr. G.P. TOZZOLI

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

Mexico:

Mr. Ernesto de SANTIAGO
Miss E. AGUIRRE
Mr. Manuel TELLO
Miss Ofelia Reyes RETANA

Nigeria:

Mr. L.C.N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. M. LOBODYCZ
Mr. E. STANIEWSKI
Mr. J. GOLDBLAT

Romania:

Mr. V. DUMITRESCU
Mr. E. GLASER
Mr. C. UNGUREANU
Mr. I. IACOB

Sweden:

Mr. P. LIND
Mr. P. HAMMARSKJOLD

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN
Mr. I.G. USACHEV
Mr. V.V. SHUSTOV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A. FATTAH HASSAN
Mr. A. OSMAN
Mr. M. KASSEM
Mr. S.E. IBRAHIM

United Kingdom:

Sir Paul MASON
Mr. J.G. TANCURDIN
Mr. J.M. EDES

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

United States of America:

Mr. A.S. FISHER

Mr. A.L. RICHARDS

Mr. T.R. PICKERING

Mr. R.A. MARTIN

Special Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. D. PROTITCH

Deputy Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Czechoslovakia): I declare open the 175th meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. FISHER (United States of America): For the past two months we have been discussing the positions of each side on nuclear weapons and their means of delivery. Both sides have proposed solutions to the problems posed by these armaments. This morning I want to comment on the proposals of each side. I should like to do so in the light of the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles (ENDC/5).

We work towards general disarmament in the knowledge that a rough balance of destructive capability has been reached on both sides. Unfortunate as it may be, the peace today is a result of this rough balance, and it is the tremendous power of the destructive armaments lying behind this rough balance which impels us to search for better ways to keep the peace. Much as we are concerned with the existence of these armaments, however, our efforts here will be successful only when we recognize that we can reduce them only in a way which does not disturb the balance which we know exists.

We have agreed to preserve the balance in principle 5 of the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles, which states that during the disarmament process no State or group of States should gain military advantage and that security should be ensured for all. Our primary efforts should be to safeguard the balance of security as disarmament proceeds.

The United States proposals (ENDC/30 and Corr.1 and Add.1,2,3) take the present situation in the world, where a rough balance exists, and in accordance with principle 5 provide for balanced reductions. We propose to accomplish these reductions in much the same way as a balloon filled with air is reduced, changing its size without changing its shape.

We have proposed two methods to accomplish the task of balanced reductions.

The first is the cutting of major armaments across the board. This has to do with the spread of armaments which are to be cut. The principle of across-the-board cuts of major armaments ensures that no important weapon or weapon system is left out of the reduction process. Every State involved in the reductions knows that each of the other parties will be subject to reductions in similar weapon systems. Across-the-board cuts also avoid the major problem of how to weigh or measure different arms against one another.

(Mr. Fisher, United States)

The second is uniform percentage cuts of armaments. This has to do with the depth of the cuts. Reductions by percentages have a number of advantages. Provided the percentage cuts are uniform, the proportion which each side cuts is even.

In the field of collateral measures, in contrast with general disarmament, we are attempting to find selected areas of the arms race in which action can be taken prior to reaching agreement on comprehensive reductions. It is important to realize that the question of balance is germane also to collateral measures, such as the United States proposals for a freeze and the destruction of certain bombers (ENDC/120), as well as to comprehensive reductions.

This discussion of the way in which our proposals maintain balanced reductions leads me to my second point.

The recent Soviet proposal on nuclear delivery vehicles (ENDC/2/Rev.1/Add.1) has been called a step forward in certain respects. At the same time, if we understand it correctly, it has several important disadvantages.

The first of those disadvantages is the imbalance which would result if it were put into effect.

First, the Gromyko proposal, as we now understand it, means that the Soviet plan has several criteria for reductions. Under it, we are told, some armaments are to be eliminated altogether in the first stage. We have been told that under that plan all nuclear delivery vehicles are to be eliminated except for a few land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, anti-missile missiles, and surface-to-air missiles, which could be retained by the United States and the Soviet Union. But we do not yet know, two years after the initial proposal was made and almost six months after the latest modification, exactly what categories of nuclear delivery vehicles are included in that Soviet proposal. Moreover, we do not yet know what quantities of such delivery vehicles will be retained.

We have an additional category. This category includes the conventional armaments which will be reduced by percentages -- 30 per cent in the first stage and 35 per cent in each of the following stages.

(Mr. Fisher, United States)

This system of reductions, of course, would result in radical shifts in the present balance, without any apparent concern about what the results of the shifts would be. Further, the Soviet Union plan, as I understand it, does not provide a concrete basis for reductions. Those of us not on the Soviet side of this negotiating table are not able to gain a clear idea of what the final balance would look like. We are told in effect that we must agree in principle to a proposal which will involve imbalances in order to see how grave those imbalances might be. We should like to know the exact position of the Soviet Union on these questions. But of course we are not ready to agree in principle to an unknown proposal in order to find out just what the proposal involves.

A second weakness in the Gromyko proposal is the manner in which it deals with verification. The Soviet Union made a small forward step when it accepted some control over declared retained missiles. This control is apparently to commence only at the beginning of stage II. It is apparently to include the launching pads only for those missiles which the Soviet Union tells us it is retaining. However, the most recent changes in the Soviet draft treaty do not appear to reflect that offer.

Furthermore, it seems that verification of even declared retained vehicles will not take place in stage I. That will mean that, as disarmament proceeds in stage I, presumably only the vehicles being destroyed will be verified. It will mean that for stage I there will be apparently no declarations of exactly what each side retains as the eighteen-month period suggested by the Soviet Union progresses.

Obviously serious imbalances could result from such a process. Neither side would have the means of knowing that the other was in fact destroying its entire stock of delivery vehicles -- other than those permitted -- during the process. Nor would there even be the control at the launching pads which the Soviet Union is apparently willing to provide at the beginning of stage II.

In addition, even if there were control at the launching pads in the first and following stages, there still exists the problem of land-based mobile missiles. It is apparent that a small number of land-based mobile missiles could be transported long distances in a very short period of time. They do not require fixed launching pads. In an area where verification was restricted to the launching pads, such

(Mr. Fisher, United States)

missiles might never become known. Their mobility would permit large numbers to be retained without fear of discovery. Their mobility would also permit rapid strategic deployment to the disadvantage of the other side.

In this area of prime importance to national security, no responsible official can accept the unverified word of another on such questions as the reductions of nuclear delivery vehicles. Mr. Burns has pointed out how the retention of a small number of missiles under such circumstances would become more and more critical the fewer the retained missiles permitted on each side. But I cannot find in the Soviet proposal any attempt to provide assurances on this score.

To sum up: we know very little about what the Soviet Union proposes to provide in the way of verification. This is true with respect to missiles which are declared to be in existence in stage I, to undeclared missiles in every stage, and particularly to mobile missiles whose launching sites are not fixed.

Third, there are a number of very acute problems which exist in respect to measures with which the Gromyko proposal is linked: the withdrawal of foreign troops, and the abandonment of overseas bases.

A number of past statements from our side have shown that the Western system of alliances grew out of the challenges presented by the Communist bloc in the years following the Second World War. Under its own proposals on troops and bases, the Soviet Union, because of its size and location, its interior lines of communication, and its large store of conventional armaments, would be in a very advantageous military position in Western Europe.

The Soviet proposals would work basic changes in the alliance without at the same time changing the military factors which caused that alliance to be joined. The imbalances thus caused are another factor in our strong questioning of the realism of such an approach and of the practicality of the Soviet proposals.

Fourth, there is the problem of peace-keeping machinery. The Soviet representative reaffirmed on 25 February his Government's position: first opposing the creation of international peace-keeping forces outside the framework of a treaty on general and complete disarmament; and second, declaring that any peace-keeping forces created within the framework of general and complete disarmament should be subject to a double veto: that is, the veto of the Security Council in the first instance, and in addition the veto implicit in a troika command of the force (ENDC/PV.169, p.26). In view of the Soviet opposition to the creation of a truly

(Mr. Fisher, United States)

effective international peace force under the United Nations before, during or after disarmament, we may ask precisely how the "nuclear umbrella" simplifies the problem of peace-keeping as our Soviet colleague claimed on 4 February (ENDC/PV.163, p.21). We might ask, with all respect: "Does the 'nuclear umbrella' in reality simplify or aggravate the difficulties?"

As the third stage nears an end, under the Soviet proposals all States with the exception of the United States and the Soviet Union would be approaching complete disarmament. But what happens to the security of the rest of the world?

On the one hand the non-nuclear Powers might feel that the "nuclear umbrella" could be turned into an instrument of nuclear blackmail. With no conventional forces, no system of alliances, and no effective international institutions for maintaining the peace, the nuclear threat would appear to us to loom larger over the non-nuclear States than it does even today.

On the other hand, clashes of interest between smaller nations are bound to occur, even under the Soviet proposals. As all nations approach complete conventional disarmament, how does retention of the "nuclear umbrella" by the United States and

Soviet Union simplify the problem of bringing about the peaceful settlement of disputes among lesser Powers? How is aggression by a middle Power against a smaller neighbour to be deterred? Neither the Gromyko proposal, nor the Soviet proposal for national contingents under a Security Council veto and troika command, provides a satisfactory answer to those problems. In short, these proposals, it appears to us, might increase the opportunities for both tyranny and anarchy in the international community.

Finally, there is the problem of the philosophy which the Soviet Union has claimed underlies its proposal. This question is important because it appears to be a major factor by which the Soviet Union distinguishes its proposal from ours.

The Soviet representative has claimed many times in this Conference that the Soviet proposal eliminates, or ends, the possibility of nuclear war in the first stage. He has called this the keystone of the Soviet approach.

(Mr. Fisher, United States)

When the Western side pointed out that there was always a possibility of retaining clandestine missiles under the original Soviet plan, the Soviet Union offered the "additional guarantees" which it says are contained in its proposal. These guarantees involve the threat of nuclear retaliation to offset the clandestine retention of any missiles.

But retaining the threat of nuclear war to deter such a war means that, in effect, the possibility of such a war would remain. In fact, under the Soviet plan the threat of such a war could exist through the third stage and beyond. I say "beyond stage III" because there is still no clear indication in the Soviet proposal that missiles clandestinely retained might not remain after the end of the disarmament process. It is also clear that the threat will remain through stage III because, as the Soviet Union itself has pointed out, the deterrent nature of the missiles to be retained clearly involves the threat of nuclear war.

The point here -- and this is also said with the greatest respect -- is that the Soviet Union cannot at once proclaim the superiority of its plan because it eliminates early the threat of nuclear war and at the same time argue that verification and peace-keeping are unnecessary because of the United-States-Soviet "nuclear umbrella". The "umbrella" itself depends on the threat of nuclear war. The Soviet Union -- if I may use an American aphorism -- "cannot have its cake and eat it too" regarding this proposal.

In conclusion, the Soviet proposal as it now stands seems to ignore many of the most important strictures of the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles. We hope that in future discussions with the Soviet representative he will show that he has taken into account this aspect of the present world.

I have made these observations, not in any spirit of contention, but in the hope that by thoughtful discussion we can further the progress we have already made in this Conference.

The CHAIRMAN (Czechoslovakia): Permit me now to take the floor on behalf of the Czechoslovak delegation and to make three short comments.

(The Chairman, Czechoslovakia)

First of all, I should like to refer to the remarks made on 10 March by the representative of the United Kingdom, Sir Paul Mason. Sir Paul said that the statement by the Czechoslovak delegation on 3 March (ENDC/PV.171, pp.16 et seq.) rather disappointed him. He added that nothing that we had said then changed his conviction --

"... that we should continue to search out areas of common ground between the two sides wherever there is any hope that those may exist." (ENDC/PV.173, p.18)

We cannot imagine that Sir Paul Mason could not understand the meaning of what we said at the 171st meeting. Nevertheless, in his statement he attempted to create the impression that the Czechoslovak delegation did not wish to seek areas of common ground. What was the point of our argument at the 171st meeting? It was that, in the course of our discussion on the Soviet Union's proposal for establishing the so-called "nuclear umbrella" (ENDC/2/Rev.1/Add.1), the delegations of the Western Powers, and that of the United Kingdom in particular, have tried to impute to the socialist delegations views that they have never held. I have in mind here especially the unfounded assertions that the socialist countries recognized the so-called nuclear deterrent as the main guarantee of peace, and that the proposal for establishing the "nuclear umbrella" made it possible to wage a nuclear war until the end of the disarmament process.

Everyone knows that that is not the case, but that the "nuclear umbrella", as a complementary guarantee of security -- on which the Western Powers have placed so much emphasis in the past -- is of a purely defensive nature. Neither any nuclear deterrent nor any military balance -- which at any rate is immeasurable and incomparable -- can be regarded as the main guarantee of a nation's security. It is, in our opinion, solely general and complete disarmament which constitutes such a guarantee.

The Czechoslovak delegation and all the other delegations of the socialist countries unswervingly seek common ground for agreements and, in the interest of progress, do their best to meet the positions of the Western Powers. The very aim of the Soviet Union's proposal now under discussion was to make such common ground possible. If that has not been achieved, it is only because the Western Powers have not taken any significant step forward to bring about a rapprochement of views in the field of general and complete disarmament since the negotiations began in 1962.

(The Chairman, Czechoslovakia)

The attempts to make people believe that there is a certain common ground by attributing to the other side views which, as is well known, it never held cannot be regarded as a serious effort in the search for a common ground on which to reach agreement. A typical example of such a method was, again, the statement of the representative of the United Kingdom at the 173rd meeting, when he tried to prove that there were areas of agreement on certain questions where in fact there was no agreement at all. This again confirmed that we were right in our intervention at the 171st meeting.

Further, I should like to make a few brief comments on the discussion of the Soviet Government's proposal to create the so-called "nuclear umbrella".

It stands out as a significant characteristic of our discussion of the Soviet proposal that nothing to which the Western delegations have referred when raising their objections has weakened its importance as an effective measure which, if adopted, would make it possible to solve the problem of the elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles and would be conducive to the elimination of the threat of nuclear war at the very beginning of the disarmament process. In our opinion, even the representative of the United States was unable to weaken the solid basis of the Soviet proposal by his arguments this morning.

The substance and the nature of the proposal, which is a purely defensive complementary guarantee of security, have been underlined repeatedly in the Committee by the Soviet delegation and by the other socialist delegations. The proposal was recently clarified in a very convincing manner also as regards the reason why, for example, anti-missile missiles should be a part of the "nuclear umbrella", and why, on the other hand, nuclear submarines equipped with missiles should be excluded from it (ENDC/PV.173, pp.29,30).

However, the delegations of the Western Powers have apparently not abandoned their effort to find some shortcomings in the Soviet proposal and thus to diminish its significance. Their artificially-constructed argumentation is contrary to all logic. Let us note, for example, how greatly the Western delegations have been trying to prove that one type of weapon -- more specifically, the anti-missile missile -- would upset the military balance which they so often evoke, while another type -- the nuclear submarine -- is in their proclaimed view almost a phenomenon of peace, since such weapons constitute an important part of the so-called nuclear deterrent.

(The Chairman, Czechoslovakia)

In the light of the facts, such contentions cannot in the least hold true. The anti-missile missile is a purely defensive weapon which cannot be used to launch a nuclear attack against the other side. Can the delegations of the Western Powers prove that the opposite is true? Indeed, nuclear submarines, which are practically incapable of being systematically controlled, are weapons which may be used primarily for launching a surprise attack. The "nuclear umbrella" proposal envisages quite unequivocally that the weapons in question would be kept exclusively in the territories of the Soviet Union and the United States, where permanent and reliable control would be ensured directly at the launching pads. That is why nuclear submarines, according to the point of view of the socialist countries, have no place within the "nuclear umbrella".

Another objection raised recently by the Western delegations, and in particular by the delegations of the United Kingdom and Italy, relates to the problem of hidden weapons. That problem was mentioned, among other things, by the representative of Italy, Mr. Cavalletti, on 10 March (ibid., p.26). At that meeting the United Kingdom representative, Sir Paul Mason, asserted that the Soviet Union was unwilling to accept any control in respect of "undeclared and illegally-retained missiles" (ibid., p.19). The question of the verification of hidden weapons has been dealt with extensively this morning by the representative of the United States also.

We cannot understand why the Western delegations cling to that argument, knowing, as they do, the following facts.

First, the missiles retained within the "nuclear umbrella" would be subject to control at the launching pads from the beginning of stage II in such a way that the number of missiles should not be greater than the number of launching pads;

Second, the Soviet draft (ENDC/2/Rev.1) envisages broad and reliable measures of control during stage I over both the elimination of delivery vehicles and the prohibition of their continued production;

Third, the "nuclear umbrella" itself would, by its substance, nature and constitution, form the best possible complementary guarantee against the possibility that a country might intend to retain missiles illegally;

Fourth, in view of the high technical standard and complexity of the existing missiles and nuclear weapons and their servicing, their clandestine storage is very problematical -- not to mention their clandestine production, to which the representative of the United Kingdom drew the attention of the Committee in its working paper submitted as early as 1962 (ENDC/53);

(The Chairman, Czechoslovakia)

Fifth, even a hypothetical use of several of the illegally-retained missiles and nuclear weapons would not bring the expected advantage to the aggressor, since (a) the military potential of States would be considerably restricted in the course of the disarmament process or would be almost non-existent, so that the aggressor could not reach his main objective, namely to win the war; and (b) the aggressor would place himself in the position of being subject to all measures at the disposal of States for use against a violator of the treaty on general and complete disarmament -- that is, the means provided for by the "nuclear umbrella", as well as the measures which the Security Council would have at its disposal for keeping the peace during the disarmament process,

Sixth and finally, it is well known that, according to article 38 of the Soviet draft treaty on general and complete disarmament, by the end of stage III, when disarmament will be general and complete, control also will be all-embracing and comprehensive. Inspectors of the international disarmament organization shall have the right of --

"... access at any time to any point within the territory of each State party to the Treaty". (ENDC/2/Rev.1, p.26)

It also envisages the possibility of instituting aerial inspection and aerial photography.

We should not forget, either, that confidence in international relations will be continually strengthened during the course of disarmament and that the possibilities of violation of the treaty will diminish very rapidly.

From what I have said it follows that the so-called problem of control of clandestinely-retained weapons is artificially constructed by the delegations of the Western Powers.

The Czechoslovak delegation listened with the utmost interest at the meeting of 3 March to the statement by Mr. Cavalletti, who said

"To make sure that no weapon has been illegally retained somewhere, in some country, the control required would be so extensive, particularly in the case of very large countries, as to be practically impossible. To insist on such control would really mean that disarmament was not wanted." (ENDC/PV.171, p.14)

(The Chairman, Czechoslovakia)

Mr. Cavalletti said, further, that when we are faced with the danger inherent in the armament race "... disarmament implies a certain amount of courage ..." (ibid.)

We agree with the representative of Italy to a considerable extent. Some time ago we welcomed the fact that the Western Powers had abandoned their former attitude in relation to absolute control, such as was mentioned by Mr. Cavalletti, which in 1960 served the Western delegations at the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament as a pretext for frustrating negotiations.

I said that we agreed with the representative of Italy to a considerable extent, because, in pursuing his argument, Mr. Cavalletti tried to prove that the percentage reduction of weapons provided for in the Western proposal (ENDC/30 and Corr.1 and Add. 1, 2, 3) makes the problem of the so-called hidden weapons less urgent. As we have pointed out, however, under the Soviet proposal this problem is practically non-existent as regards both the disarmament measures which will have been effected and the broad control which will have been introduced. The "nuclear umbrella" would play the positive role of being an additional guarantee of security until the very end of the disarmament process.

On the other hand, under the United States proposal, after more than six years we should face a situation when stage III would be overloaded with disarmament measures in relation to delivery vehicles and nuclear weapons, and the possibility of waging a nuclear war on a wide scale would still exist. Is it not evident that the Soviet proposal offers States much better guarantees in this respect?

The urgent interests of the security of all mankind, and the necessity to make progress in general and complete disarmament, call for utilizing the exceptionally promising possibility represented by the Soviet proposal for creating a protective "nuclear umbrella", which was submitted at the eighteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly. If the Western Powers really wish general and complete disarmament to become a reality, if they wish to prove that their main aim is not to introduce "control over armament" and to preserve the possibility of waging nuclear war during the whole process of disarmament, then they could and should accept the Soviet proposal; because the Soviet proposal was submitted precisely in order to meet the other side half-way and to find common ground for reaching agreement on general and complete disarmament.

Mr. BURNS (Canada): I have listened with great interest to the statement which you, Mr. Chairman, have just made, as well as to the statement made by the representative of the United States. I am afraid that I cannot agree with very many of the points which you made in the statement you have just concluded, particularly in your argument that no more control, no more verification, would be required in respect of Mr. Gromyko's "umbrella" proposal than had been announced in the various statements of the Soviet delegation to this Conference.

What I had proposed to say this morning was mainly in relation to statements made at our 173rd and 174th meetings by delegations of the Warsaw Pact countries; and the purpose, of course, is to carry on our dialogue on the reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, and on the Gromyko proposal for the "nuclear umbrella" (ENDC/2/Rev.1/Add.1) which has been advanced as a part of the process. In other words, I shall be speaking on the same subject as the two preceding speakers today.

On 10 March the representative of Bulgaria said:

"In any case it is necessary to eliminate the danger of nuclear war in the initial stage of the disarmament process." (ENDC/PV.173, p.5)

The same sort of statement can be culled from the speeches of other Warsaw Pact countries which are represented here.

Mr. Lukanov stated that:

"... this view has been shared ... by nearly all the States Members of the United Nations, except certain Western countries." (ibid.)

He then proceeded to quote from statements which had been made by representatives of non-aligned countries in this Committee on various dates in 1962. That was at the outset of our negotiations. The quotations supported the general principle that it would be desirable to get rid of nuclear weapons as early as possible; but I doubt whether any of the delegations quoted would now be prepared to say, in view of all the discussions which have taken place in this Committee, that to get rid of all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles in the first stage, desirable as it might be, would be practicable in the world today. In fact the best proof is that since those quoted statements were made the Soviet Union, by changing its plan twice, as announced by Mr. Gromyko at the seventeenth and eighteenth sessions of the United Nations General Assembly, has acknowledged

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

that the idea of getting rid of all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles in the first stage is not one which it would be practicable to negotiate.

We have heard a great deal about the horrors of nuclear war, and we all agree. We all want to get rid of the possibility of a nuclear war as soon as feasible -- and I emphasize that --; but, in getting rid of the possibility of nuclear war, we do not want to leave the possibility of conventional war. I am sure that the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact States which suffered enormously in the last great "conventional" war will fully agree with that principle.

What now deters the nations which possess nuclear armaments from using them to enforce their policies in the international field? The fact, as was stressed by our colleague from the United States, that both sides -- the United States and the United Kingdom on the one side and the Soviet Union on the other -- have the means to inflict such devastation that no political object would be worth the risk of incurring it. In other words, we have a balance of nuclear power -- or of nuclear terror, if you like. That does not mean, of course, that both sides have the same number of weapons or equivalent means of delivering them.

Furthermore, this balance of nuclear power also inhibits any large-scale use of conventional military forces, because in the existing circumstances any war, on the continent of Europe at any rate, would immediately become a nuclear war. But this is an unstable balance and can be upset, as many learned papers by United States so-called "strategic analysts" have shown, and I do not believe that the Soviet representative would contest their arguments.

Therefore it is important and vital to find the means, first, to stop the arms race, the desperate search for ever new weapon systems, and then to start reducing the present roughly-balanced nuclear deterrents to a minimum as quickly as that can be done without upsetting the balance or raising fears that the nuclear terror will be replaced by another kind of terror -- the fear of interference in the affairs of other nations by various means involving varying degrees of violence up to the maximum of another conventional war.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

How do we get to this minimum balanced nuclear deterrent, of which Mr. Gromyko's "umbrella" is a rather over-simplified prototype, if I may say so? Canadian representatives, among other Western representatives, welcomed Mr. Gromyko's first and second modifications of the Soviet Union's original plan for abolishing every kind of nuclear vehicle in the first stage of disarmament, because we saw in them increased possibilities of agreement on how to achieve this intermediate stage in nuclear disarmament; for Mr. Gromyko's "umbrella", or any other measure to reduce to a balanced minimum the nuclear deterrent, is to be regarded only as the step before final and complete abolition of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery.

Delegations of the socialist States have often objected to the proposals contained in the United States disarmament plan (ENDC/30 and Corr.1 and Add.1,2, 3) for the reduction of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles by approximately one-third in each of the three stages. They demand that in the first stage all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles must be abolished. But if, instead of insisting on this unattainable object, they had adopted the United States idea of percentage reductions, and if that had been put into effect as a first stage in 1962, what would have happened? There were perhaps between 100 and 200 intercontinental ballistic missiles on each side in existence at that time. If the percentage reduction had been applied against, say, 150 intercontinental ballistic missiles, there would be only 100 or less on each side now instead of what we have. What a difference that would be!

The Committee may feel that on the face of it this is an "if we had only done so-and-so" kind of argument and hence unrealistic; but the point is that, because the Soviet Union has been trying to grasp too much, or to do too much at one time, we have not been able to get agreement on anything.

I should like to recount to the Committee one of Aesop's fables, about the boy and the filberts. A boy once thrust his hand into a jar which was full of filberts. He grasped as many as his fist could possibly hold, but when he tried to draw it out the narrowness of the neck of the jar prevented him. Not wishing to lose any of them but anxious to draw out his hand, he burst into tears and complained bitterly. A bystander advised him: "Take only a few at a time, my lad, and you will easily get them".

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

We heard from the Soviet representative at our meeting of 12 March (ENDC/PV.174, pp. 44 et seq.) a series of strong objections to the United States plan for a freeze of the number and characteristics of strategic nuclear offensive and defensive vehicles (ENDC/120). We think that some of the criticisms show that the Soviet representative has not really understood the intention and scope of the proposal. We believe that the United States delegation will soon reply to the points which Mr. Tsarapkin has raised. We hope it will be possible to continue the discussion of the nuclear freeze proposal, which the Canadian delegation supports as one of the most hopeful collateral measures, of great potential importance in putting a stop to the arms race. We hope that future debate on that subject can be continued in a constructive way, forgoing all polemics.

If the building of any more of these intercontinental ballistic missiles could be stopped here and now, what an advantage it would be for the world! In a better atmosphere, knowing that the number of these engines was not building up all the time, we could move much faster in solving the problem of reducing and finally eliminating the differences between the Western approach and the Soviet Union approach to getting rid of nuclear weapon vehicles.

I must confess I found it rather difficult to follow the arguments adduced by the Bulgarian representative on 10 March in regard to the demands of the Western nations for proper measures of control over all disarmament measures (ENDC/PV.173, pp.9, 10). Surely that is one of the principles which was agreed (ENDC/5). Mr. Lukanov related his remarks particularly to the Canadian delegation's having raised this question with regard to Mr. Gromyko's "umbrella". He then went on to say:

"It is time indeed to clear the question of control out of our way as an obstacle to agreement ..." (ENDC/PV.173, p.9)

I think, Mr. Chairman, you made a similar comment yourself in your statement today. Then the representative of Bulgaria made the unacceptable suggestion:

"Let us agree on what we want to achieve ..." (ibid.)

-- which is the same as: "Let us agree in principle, and then we will discuss the details".

My delegation and other Western delegations here have stressed again and again that the principle of verification is one on which our whole negotiation must be founded. Unless it has been shown to us by those who propose any measure that it

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

is susceptible of adequate control, we cannot in principle accept such a measure; and that is the case with the Gromyko "umbrella" proposal.

I will explain further the questions that we asked and what we have been told about the control that is proposed for this group of related measures for getting rid of nuclear weapon vehicles. I hope to show how unsatisfactory the answers have been, and how necessary it is that the limited amount of explanation which has been given to us should be greatly expanded if we are to make any progress in solving the problem of reducing and eliminating nuclear weapon vehicles.

At our meeting of 18 February I asked how Mr. Gromyko's proposal was to be verified, and I pointed out that so far we had been told only that inspectors might be present on the declared intercontinental ballistic missile launching pads at the second stage. I further said that the Soviet proposals for destroying all nuclear weapon vehicles in the first stage, except the limited number postulated in the Gromyko proposals were open to the same objections which the Western countries had raised against the original Soviet proposal before the Gromyko amendments (ENDC/PV.167, p.8). All that our Soviet colleagues have told us in regard to the control measures they envisage for a general destruction of nuclear weapon vehicles is exemplified by article 5, paragraph 3, of their draft treaty for general and complete disarmament, which says:

"Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall verify the implementation of the measures referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 above." (ENDC/2/Rev.1, p.6)

-- that is, the destruction of rockets in this case.

We have recently heard the Soviet representative repeat that the Soviet Union is in favour of a strict and effective control over disarmament (ENDC/PV.174, p.50); but all that we have been able to learn about what it means by control is that it will let the inspectors witness the destruction or dismantling of armaments or disbandment of troops. However, as the West has reiterated so often, it is the possibility that some armaments may be left, that some may not be declared, and that some may exist in places where the inspectors may not go, which will create uncertainty, doubt and fear. Mr. Chairman, I am afraid that your statement this morning did not take us any further forward in meeting the difficulty to which I have just referred.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

Let me restrict the discussion for the moment to the question of destroying rockets alone. To begin with, the Western countries do not know how many the Soviet Union has, and, for the time being and until disarmament begins, it is of course within its rights in not publishing numbers, although the United States has done so. The Soviet Union has not told us how it proposes to demonstrate or verify to the world that all its rockets except those constituting Mr. Gromyko's "umbrella" are in fact destroyed.

If the West is to take the Soviet proposals as a serious basis for negotiation, it is necessary for the Soviet Union to put forward a tentative, or at least an illustrative, programme of how the territory of the Soviet Union and its allies and, at the same time, the territory of the United States and its allies would be opened up for inspection to prove that there are no rockets other than those declared at the launching pads. That programme would have to relate the areas opened, and the time they would be opened after the commencement of disarmament, and the percentage or proportion of rockets as well as all the other categories of nuclear weapons that would be supposed to be destroyed by that time.

We have also tried to find out -- and I refer to my statement of 18 February (ENDC/PV.167, pp.5 et seq.), as well as to the many other queries by Western countries -- the approximate number of intercontinental ballistic missiles which is envisaged by Mr. Gromyko's "umbrella". So far we have had no reply to indicate what is meant in figures by a "strictly limited" number, or a "definite, limited number", or a "minimum quantity" -- to quote the phrases used by Mr. Tsarapkin in his statement of 4 February 1964 (ENDC/PV.163, pp.19 and 20). The nearest we have come to such an indication might be deduced from Mr. Tsarapkin's remarks on 18 February 1964 (ENDC/PV.167, p.32), which would indicate that he thinks that 350 intercontinental ballistic missiles would be too many.

At this point I must refer to a subject which nearly all delegations must have had on their minds. We wonder why we do not make progress. We have heard from the Soviet Union and its allies that it is because of the militaristic attitudes of the Western countries. We see a different obstacle to progress. I should like to draw the attention of the Committee to an editorial in The New York Times published on 5 March 1964. It refers to the excessive concern of the Soviet Union with military secrecy, describing it as an obstacle to progress in disarmament.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

The Soviet delegation here apparently applies a kind of secrecy to the details of its proposals for disarmament; otherwise the Soviet delegation would be prepared to give the Committee the details and explanations which have been so often asked for.

We hope that the Soviet delegation will see the obstacles to progress which its attitude creates, and that it will obtain the necessary instructions so that this Committee can thoroughly examine and weigh all the disarmament and collateral proposals, which is the only way we shall be able to reach effective agreements.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): When the answers given by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Mr. A.A. Gromyko, to the correspondent of Izvestiya were published (ENDC/127), the representatives of the Western Powers tried to cast doubt on the validity of the appraisal of the unsatisfactory state of the negotiations as given in those answers. We have heard complacent arguments from the representatives of the Western countries to the effect that there is no need for concern. They have even asserted that some sort of useful work is being done in the Committee.

However, reassuring speeches, and appeals to avoid the word "impasse" in our appraisal of the state of affairs in the Committee, will not in themselves change the situation for the better. Moreover, attempts to cover up or even to embellish the real unsatisfactory state of affairs in the Committee can create the harmful illusion that the Committee is actually doing something in the field of disarmament and that there is no need for us to worry. We, however, cannot agree with such unfounded complacency. Those who are following our negotiations and who are anxious for the cause of disarmament fully agree with the severe but entirely justified comment of Mr. A.A. Gromyko when he said:

"No harsh words would be excessive in order to describe the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, if one bears in mind the practical result of the negotiations in the Committee." (ibid., p.1)

The last few meetings devoted to general and complete disarmament are a convincing illustration of this.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

It is now clear to everyone that the successful progress of the negotiations is being hampered by the fact that the Western Powers are evading a solution to the key problem of general and complete disarmament -- the problem of eliminating the danger of a nuclear war. The Soviet Government has suggested a way towards the solution of this problem by submitting the proposal for a "nuclear umbrella" (ENDC/2/Rev.1/Add.1). This proposal is intended to meet the views of the Western Powers. No one can deny that an agreement is possible only when the two sides are in accord on the principle of the matter. The point is that an agreement in principle means that the choice of a direction has been made. While there is no agreement on the main thing, it is useless to talk about details.

The Soviet Government's proposal for a "nuclear umbrella" is based, as we have thoroughly explained, on the premise that all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles will be destroyed in the first stage of disarmament and that, during the second and third stages of disarmament, only the Soviet Union and the United States will retain in their own territories a strictly limited number of missiles of specified categories. We have already told you what these categories are, and you know all about them. The principle of this proposal is that the threat of a nuclear war will be eliminated right from the first stage of disarmament, but at the same time a "nuclear umbrella" will be retained as an additional guarantee of the security of States carrying out disarmament.

Is there any need to repeat once again -- since it is acknowledged by everyone -- that the elimination of the threat of a nuclear war is an obligatory condition of general and complete disarmament? Without this condition, the programme for general and complete disarmament will become a fiction. The maintenance of the threat of a nuclear war would make it impossible to carry out general and complete disarmament. It is precisely here, in this matter, that the line passes which divides the positions like a watershed. On one side are the real advocates of disarmament; on the other side are its opponents, who are quite willing to talk about disarmament but do not wish to make it a reality.

During the discussion the fact has been quite definitely established that the percentage approach to the solution of the problem of eliminating the means of delivery of nuclear weapons (ENDC/30 and Corr. 1 and Add. 1,2,3), which is

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

defended by the Western Powers and has again been defended today in the statement of the United States representative, Mr. Fisher, is fallacious in its very basis. This approach runs counter to the idea of general and complete disarmament, because inherent in and intrinsic to such an approach is the possibility of waging a nuclear war at all stages of disarmament. The representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom, Italy and Canada have been unable to refute this conclusion. Indeed, it is impossible to refute it.

Our last meeting still further corroborated the validity of this conclusion. The members of the Committee have had an opportunity to form a clear picture of the way of thinking and the trend of the ideas of the United Kingdom representative, Sir Paul Mason, and his United States colleague Mr. Fisher. In their statements the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom have pointed out the need to safeguard one or another State against a threat to its security, and to ensure that it has the possibility of defending itself in the event of aggression during the disarmament process. We, too, are in favour of this, although we believe that the further the world goes along the path of disarmament the more stable will be the security of States, and that finally, upon completion of the disarmament process proposed by the Soviet Union, the menace of war will disappear altogether and for ever, and the security of States and of the peoples of the world will become complete.

But on the question of safeguarding the security of States, something strange is taking place in the position of the Western Powers. While the Western representatives make verbal statements in favour of safeguarding the security of States, in actual fact they insist on including in the "nuclear umbrella" such armaments as would serve diametrically-opposite purposes: namely, armaments which would serve the purposes of a clandestine surprise nuclear attack and which at the same time would not come under permanent control by means of which it would be possible to discover and expose any menacing preparations for nuclear attack. On the other hand, the Western representatives propose to exclude purely defensive missiles from those to be included in the "nuclear umbrella".

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

In general, the situation in fact turns out to be that, on the one hand, the Western Powers are ardent advocates of those types of missiles such as the Polaris, for example, which are intended for launching secret, uncontrollable, surprise nuclear blows; and on the other hand they object to the retention of defensive missiles within the scope of the "nuclear umbrella". They are in favour of what could be used for aggression, but are opposed to what would neutralize the possibility of aggression. This preference in itself shows most eloquently the general trend of the position of the Western Powers on disarmament questions.

Let us turn to what the United Kingdom representative, Sir Paul Mason, said to us (ENDC/PV.173, pp.18 et seq.). He began by casting doubt on the feasibility and effectiveness of the control which we propose over the missiles to be retained by the Soviet Union and the United States. The Canadian representative said the same thing today (*supra*, pp.16 et seq.). As we have pointed out on more than one occasion, this control can be carried out directly at the launching pads or sites. This means that the missiles retained by agreement would be under permanent control. Such control would enable each interested party to have complete assurance that no suspicious preparations for launching these missiles are being carried on by either side. Nevertheless, Sir Paul Mason is still full of doubts about the effectiveness of the control over the remaining missiles which is proposed by the Soviet Union.

But as soon as Sir Paul Mason begins to talk about Polaris missiles, all his doubts about the possibility of carrying out effective control over them vanish. On the contrary, in regard to Polaris missiles Sir Paul Mason sees no difficulty of control and is satisfied merely with periodic control during the short period when vessels carrying Polaris missiles put in at their bases. Consequently, in regard to Polaris missiles the Western Powers would not permit systematic control and permanent supervision, but only occasional control: namely, when a vessel carrying Polaris missiles returns to its base. It is well known, however, that nuclear submarines with missiles on board can navigate independently under water for many months without putting in at their bases.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

Thus the Polaris missiles on board these military vessels could be for months beyond any control. It is obvious, Sir Paul Mason, that with such a control system the security of States would not be safeguarded but the threat of surprise attack, the fear of which is constantly being mentioned by the Western representatives in their statements, would increase to a great extent.

Thus on the one hand Sir Paul Mason cannot be satisfied with the permanent control which we propose over remaining missiles directly at the launching pads; but on the other hand he is quite satisfied with occasional control when, as a representative of the Western Powers, he starts talking about including Polaris missiles in the "nuclear umbrella".

What Sir Paul Mason has said about control, his double yardstick for control in connexion with the Soviet proposals and with those of the West, the objections of the Western representatives to the inclusion of defensive missiles in the "nuclear umbrella", and their insistence on including in it missiles which are obviously intended for preparing and carrying out a clandestine surprise nuclear attack against the other side -- all these facts reveal to the members of the Committee a fairly clear picture of the real attitude of the Western Powers both to the question of safeguarding the security of States and to the question of control. They are interested in control, not as a means of supervising the implementation of disarmament measures, but as a means of achieving certain military and political aims. In the case we are considering it is clear that the Western representatives in the Committee insist on an approach which would lead to increasing the possibility of waging a nuclear war and launching a surprise nuclear attack.

In his statement the United Kingdom representative developed the theme of whose approach would be more likely to encourage illegal concealment of the means of delivery -- the Soviet approach or the Western approach. He asserted that, given the Western percentage approach, there would be no possibilities of concealing missiles, or at least they would be extremely limited, but that, given the implementation of the Soviet proposal for an agreed and strictly limited quantity of missiles to be retained within the scope of the "nuclear umbrella", there would in his opinion be such a danger.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

Actually, however, the situation is quite the opposite. The Soviet proposals on disarmament (ENDC/2/Rev.1 and Add.1) would eliminate the danger of missiles being concealed, because they would make such concealment, so to speak, unprofitable, useless for achieving its aim, and practically impossible. Let us consider under what conditions the Soviet proposal for a "nuclear umbrella" would be carried out in stage I of our disarmament programme.

During the first stage of disarmament all means of delivery, except for a strictly limited agreed number of missiles to be retained in the territories of the Soviet Union and the United States, will be destroyed under control.

All enterprises connected with the production of means of delivery will be closed or re-equipped for peaceful production under control.

All launching pads for military missiles will be eliminated under control.

All testing sites, airfields and so forth will be eliminated or re-equipped for peaceful purposes under control.

Research activities connected with improving means of delivery of nuclear weapons will be discontinued.

Scientists, engineers, technicians and workers employed in all these sectors will be transferred to peaceful activities.

The launching of missiles for the purposes of peaceful research and the conquest of outer space will be carried out under international control.

I shall not touch on other disarmament measures in the field of the reduction of armed forces and the elimination of conventional armaments.

It suffices to picture the whole breadth of the disarmament measures to be carried out and the range of control over their implementation to see clearly how untenable and groundless is the talk of the Western representatives about the possibility of concealing nuclear weapon delivery vehicles if the Soviet disarmament plan is carried out. Let us examine this question more closely. After all, the purpose of concealing the means of delivery is in order to use them. But in order to use them, complicated installations, launching pads and specialized staff are required. Given the measures proposed by us for the first and subsequent stages of disarmament and for control over their implementation, the retention of these enormous installations -- and, what is more, in secret -- would become quite impossible.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

Let us now turn to the proposals of the United States. Their outline of disarmament is designed so that in all three stages of its implementation the nuclear Powers would retain an enormous quantity of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery. Under the United States disarmament programme, plants for the replacement of missiles used for various checks and tests will continue to operate, not only during the first stage of disarmament, but also during the second and third stages.

Testing grounds for nuclear weapons and missiles will continue to operate.

Numerous skilled personnel engaged in producing, servicing and testing means of delivery will be retained.

It suffices to compare these two characterizations of the disarmament programmes -- the Soviet programme and the United States programme -- to see that the Western approach to disarmament affords all the necessary physical, material possibilities for concealing missiles and for utilizing them, whereas the Soviet disarmament programme does not.

Of course, we can foresee that the representatives of the Western Powers will deny this, and will allege that the United States proposals provide for control for the purpose of discovering hidden weapons. This control, in their opinion, should cover the whole territory of any particular country and should have the possibility of investigating and ransacking every nook, every mound or bush. The Canadian representative has confirmed this is his statement today.

Generally speaking, on this subject --- the subject of control -- the United States is reverting to its unfounded demand for the establishment of control over remaining armaments, which, as a matter of fact, means intelligence work and espionage. This becomes particularly obvious when we analyse the United States draft treaty.

In order to begin reducing the means of delivery by 30 per cent, as proposed in the United States outline of disarmament, it is of course necessary to know the whole 100 per cent of the quantity available. Well then, let us suppose that States have reported their own data. Would it be possible after that to begin making a reduction? Apparently not, because it is at that time -- namely, at the time of the submission of official data by States -- that concealment of the means of delivery would be most probable; for who would start concealing these vehicles

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during the disarmament process, when control would be in operation and, consequently, when there would be a serious risk of being caught red-handed?

Yet once the possibility of the concealment of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles at the time of submitting data on existing stocks of these vehicles is presumed, the United States leaders immediately raise the question of comprehensive control for the purpose of discovering "concealed" delivery vehicles. In practice this would mean that, before the first missile is destroyed, it would be necessary to search every industrial plant, every warehouse and arsenal, every military unit, every inhabited centre and every inch of ground -- in short, the whole country and all remaining armaments -- lest a missile might have been concealed somewhere.

And what would be the situation as a result of such an approach? -- which, incidentally, was also defended and advocated today by the representative of Canada, Mr. Burns. As a result the situation would be that in fact nothing would be done for disarmament. The whole 100 per cent of military potential and the whole 100 per cent of the means for launching a nuclear attack would remain intact; but a thorough search would be made of the whole country. If this is not espionage, if this is not military intelligence, what is it?

All the States Members of the United Nations have recognized the principle that there can be no control without disarmament and no disarmament without control. The United States and the United Kingdom have also declared their adherence to this principle. But they have not brought their proposals into line with this principle. The situation that has come about in the world today is one in which 1 per cent or, say, 3 per cent of the existing nuclear weapons would be quite enough in order to wage a devastating nuclear war. In these days the destruction of 97 or even 99 per cent of the existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons would not eliminate the terrible threat hanging over mankind.

What, then, can be said about the United States outline, which provides for a 30 per cent reduction of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles in the first stage of disarmament and for the retention of all the huge stockpiles of nuclear weapons? It is clear that this United States proposal does not meet the purposes of disarmament or the interests of the security of peoples and States. By its structure, by its nature, by its approach to the solution of the problem of disarmament, and by its methodology and philosophy, this proposal is anti-humanitarian and aimed at retaining the maximum possibilities for the destruction of mankind which exist in our times.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

The main requirement now is to eliminate the possibility, not only of over-kill, but of any destruction of peoples at all. The danger of a nuclear war must be eliminated at the very outset of the disarmament process. This is the imperative necessity of our times, and this can be achieved by putting into effect the proposals of the Soviet Union on general and complete disarmament. The Soviet draft treaty on general and complete disarmament is the only realistic plan submitted to the Committee that would eliminate the threat of over-kill in the very first stage of disarmament; whereas the Western disarmament plan would retain this terrible threat until the very end of the disarmament process --- that is, until the end of the third stage.

From those who oppose the adoption of the Soviet proposal for a "nuclear umbrella", a proposal which opens up a way to the reaching of agreement on general and complete disarmament, we hear arguments to the effect that it would be better at present to deal, not with disarmament, but with a freeze of strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons (ENDC/120). They are trying thereby to persuade us that this is a "new" approach, a new word in the field of disarmament. But what is the significance of this "new" word for peace, when, given the proposed freeze, the whole world will be even more armed than it is now, although even at the present time the peoples live constantly under the threat and terrible danger of nuclear annihilation? This new United States proposal, by freezing the existing situation in the nuclear arms race, would in fact "freeze" -- that is, preserve --- the terrible nuclear threat hanging over mankind.

If we go deeper into the United States proposal, we see that the freeze of strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons proposed by the United States is in fact a device, a convenient screen, for switching resources, production capacities and scientific and technical forces to the development of other types of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery. It is known that tactical means of delivery of nuclear weapons, just like conventional armaments, will increase in quantity and be improved in quality with still greater rapidity. That is the real nature of the United States proposal for a freeze.

Our analysis leads to a definite conclusion: namely, that without the simultaneous implementation of measures of disarmament, a freeze of strategic means of delivery cannot result in any reduction whatsoever in the threat of a nuclear war. On the contrary, it may increase the threat and render it more acute. This conclusion cannot

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

be refuted by any juggling of words or sophistry. In using these terms I am referring to the statement by Mr. Fisher, the United States representative, at our last meeting when he said that our task was

"... to see that in future years the number of armaments on this earth is less than might otherwise be the case." (ENDC/PV.174, p.30).

Less by comparison with what, Mr. Fisher? By comparison with the present number? Your freeze proposal does not provide for this. In saying this, Mr. Fisher, you were engaging in sophistry or simply playing with words.

On a number of occasions the representatives of the United States have used menacing words in the Committee. While announcing that the United States was determined to step up the arms race still further, they have at the same time promised that they will not do so to the full extent if foreign -- in other words, United States -- control is established over the most important, the most secret branch of the defence industry of the USSR and over its whole territory. This request for control without disarmament is purely and simply a request for complete freedom of action to engage in intelligence activities and espionage. The Soviet Union has already repeatedly said that it cannot and will not permit this.

In the interests of a correct understanding of the real reasons for the United States proposal for a freeze of strategic means of delivery, it is helpful to re-examine the background of this proposal. The military leaders of the United States, having, according to their own assertions, accumulated gigantic stocks of nuclear weapons which are large enough to destroy all their targets on this planet many times over, have now resolved to switch their resources, production capacity and military effort from the production of strategic means of delivering nuclear weapons into an intensified race in regard to other means of delivery and to conventional armaments. The net result of this United States proposal would be a shift in the centre of gravity, in the emphasis, of the United States arms programme from one field of armaments to another. We demonstrated at the last meeting that this is indeed the aim of the leaders in the Pentagon (ibid, p.48). Nevertheless, it is clear that this shift of emphasis in the armaments race would in no way constitute "disarmament in the most meaningful sense of the word", as Mr. Fisher has tried to assert (ibid., p.30).

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

In their efforts to substitute discussion of a freeze for discussion of general and complete disarmament, the Western Powers are obstructing a solution to the problem of general and complete disarmament and are steering the talks away from a solution to this important question. It should be noted that, through its freeze proposal, the United States is seeking to prevent the adoption of the Soviet proposal for elimination of bomber aircraft (ENDC/123), although it is obvious to everyone that there is no comparison between these two proposals so far as their possible contribution to a solution of the disarmament problem is concerned. We need only compare the following aspects of the proposals to be convinced of that fact.

A freeze means, I repeat, that all the strategic missiles now available in the stockpiles and arsenals of the nuclear Powers, all bomber aircraft, and all other nuclear delivery vehicles would be retained fully intact in the armaments of States. Adoption of this United States proposal would not have the effect of slowing down the arms race, which would, on the contrary, be intensified in the area of tactical nuclear weapons and conventional armaments. The Soviet proposal for eliminating bomber aircraft, on the other hand, is a measure of physical disarmament. It would mean the destruction of thousands of aircraft capable of carrying nuclear weapons. This measure does not, of course, amount to removal of the threat of a nuclear war -- the removal of this threat would be ensured by the Soviet draft treaty on general and complete disarmament --; but the elimination of bomber aircraft would nevertheless substantially reduce the threat of a nuclear war.

Acceptance of the Soviet proposal for the elimination of bomber aircraft can "open the path to reductions in all types of forces from present levels", the goal suggested by Mr. Johnson, the President of the United States, in his message to the Committee (ENDC/120, p.2). The elimination of bomber aircraft would indeed be a definite advance towards the elimination of the existing means of conducting nuclear war. Implementation of this measure would make it easier to take the next step -- elimination of the other means of delivering nuclear weapons and, above all, of missiles -- and thus remove the threat of nuclear war.

A freeze would not affect in the slightest the vast armaments in the possession of States, and does not meet the needs of disarmament. A freeze means control without disarmament. Such a measure can lead only to greater distrust in relations among States, an acceleration of the arms race, and an increased danger of the outbreak of an aggressive war.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

If we analyse the records of our Committee's discussions on general and complete disarmament during its last two months of work, we cannot fail to see that the representatives of the Western Powers are in effect veering away from serious and constructive consideration of this crucial current problem. At our Tuesday meetings, which are devoted to general and complete disarmament, the Western representatives largely confine themselves to raising a variety of artificial and irrelevant issues and seeking to substitute a discussion of individual technical points for a discussion of the essential substance of our proposal. In his statement today Mr. Fisher did not give any new arguments in support of the United States position. The questions he asked today are not new either, but have been put by representatives of the Western Powers before; we have answered them in previous statements and also in our statement today. We of course reserve the right to make additional observations if this is justified by our study of the text of Mr. Fisher's statement today.

The discussions have shown that the representatives of the Western Powers are doing their utmost to drag out the talks and are taking no action that might facilitate the speedy preparation of a treaty on general and complete disarmament and the removal of the threat of nuclear war. We deplore the fact that the representatives of the Western Powers are consistently refraining from defining their position on the substantive issue -- in other words, from indicating whether they accept the Soviet proposal for destroying all nuclear delivery vehicles in the first stage of disarmament except for a limited number to be retained as part of the "nuclear umbrella."

We much regret that the United States representative, in his statement today, shed no positive light on the position of the Western Powers on the central and most urgent question, that of removing the threat of a nuclear war. As is clear from the views expressed today by Mr. Fisher, the representative of the United States, that country continues to adhere to its vicious concept of disarmament, which is to disarm in such a way that the threat of a nuclear war still exists and deliberately to preserve this threat during all three stages of disarmament. This is, of course, not disarmament, but the antithesis of disarmament. The sooner the Western Powers give a positive answer to this key question in the negotiations, the easier it will be to solve all the other problems of disarmament. The prospects of progress in the disarmament talks lie in that direction, and we urge the Western Powers to give us an answer, to move in that direction.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): I should like to make a few brief remarks on this morning's debate and on that of last Tuesday about general and complete disarmament (ENDC/PV.173). We have heard some important speeches today, and naturally I shall study them carefully in the records.

The Eastern delegations have played their full part in the debate on the Gromyko proposal. Last Tuesday speeches were made by the representatives of Bulgaria, Romania and the Soviet Union, while today the representatives of Czechoslovakia, and again of the Soviet Union, took the floor. Unfortunately, although I listened to these speeches with the greatest attention, I cannot say that I found in them any new elements which would really provide answers to the various questions asked by us.

At the beginning of his speech this morning Mr. Tsarapkin introduced a certain note of pessimism, with which, however, I certainly do not wish to associate myself. From the very outset we have known that the difficulties were very great and very serious, particularly as regards general and complete disarmament, and especially its first stage. Consequently no one should be surprised that we have not yet found a solution.

I must say, however, that the Soviet and other Eastern delegations have not so far done anything to reduce these difficulties. They continue to regard as matters of detail or artificial issues -- that was the term used by Mr. Tsarapkin this morning, I believe -- those grave problems which we have raised very objectively and which, in our view, stem from the Gromyko proposal (ENDC/2/Rev.1/Add.1). Really, I do not think that this attitude towards our requests for explanations and the problems raised by us is a correct one. For my part, to promote a more thorough study of the Gromyko proposal and try to overcome our difficulties, I proposed that each problem should be studied systematically and in detail, and that some sort of agenda should be drawn up, particularly for the Gromyko proposal. But that idea met with no response from the Eastern delegations.

The representatives of the Western Powers, whose speeches were equally numerous and searching, drew special attention to three types of problems raised by the Gromyko proposal: namely the maintenance of a balance, control, and the peaceful organization of the world. These problems were once more expounded very lucidly this morning by the United States representative, Mr. Fisher. As I see it, if these problems are not studied separately, we run the risk of wasting our time and sinking into a morass of confusion. That there is a risk of confusion can be seen from Mr. Tsarapkin's speech last Tuesday, in which he said

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

"At the same time we were told by the Western Powers that allegedly they could not absolutely destroy all missiles. They reasoned as follows: 'What if someone illegally retains or hides a number of missiles? We must have some sort of assurance', they said, 'of being in a position to launch a nuclear counter-blow'. The raising of this question itself is groundless, most unconvincing and purely speculative. Nevertheless, since this was an obstacle to agreement, the Soviet Union made a concession to the position, the point of view, of the Western Powers, even though, I repeat, it is groundless." (ENDC/PV.173, p.28)

And later on Mr. Tsarapkin went on to say:

"It was in order to go towards meeting the claims of the Western Powers that they needed to have something in case of a supposedly possible surprise attack by means of supposedly possible concealed missiles, that we proposed the 'nuclear umbrella'. (ibid., p.29)

A similar thought was, I believe, expressed this morning by the Czechoslovak representative, Mr. Zemla. These views call, I feel, for some remarks by us.

We never said that it would be impossible to destroy all the missiles, for fear that some missiles might be hidden away in violation of the agreement. We did say that we want to destroy all missiles --- all missiles! --- without a solitary exception, but in a gradual and balanced manner; because that is the only realistic way of doing it without compromising the existing military balance and thus without compromising peace.

I believe that the idea I have just set forth is quite different from the interpretation given to our views by the Soviet and Czechoslovak delegations. The question of hidden missiles is of course a matter of serious concern to us, as I have stressed in a previous speech (ENDC/PV.171, pp. 14-16). But this problem lies within the province of control, not within that of the maintenance of a balance. If the question of clandestine missiles -- or, for that matter, of hidden weapons in general -- is introduced into the balance problem, this becomes insoluble. If, as Mr. Tsarapkin seems to think, it is desired to keep supplementary weapons to guard against possible concealed weapons, disarmament itself becomes impossible.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

Without effective control, there is no limit to the number of weapons that can be hidden. There is no way of knowing how many weapons can be hidden by a country of bad faith, and to guard against such a danger -- unknown and unknowable -- it would be necessary to maintain an unlimited arsenal of weapons. In reality, if weapons are retained during the disarmament process, it is to permit of a balanced process of disarmament, and for no other reason. The problem of hidden weapons belongs to the subject of control; it can be solved by inspection, not by open and legal possession of other weapons.

Mr. Tsarapkin stated that authorized and declared missiles should remain under permanent control. We entirely agree. But, within the framework of the Gromyko proposal, we still want to know to what type of control -- permanent or not, total or not -- any hidden missiles will be subject.

I am addressing this question likewise to the Czechoslovak representative, who this morning (Supra, p.14) quoted a passage on control from a speech by the Italian delegation at a previous meeting. He spoke of courage. Well, I agree that courage is necessary in dealing with control, as indeed with all aspects of disarmament, while making due allowance for the very grave dangers which at present exist owing to the absence of disarmament. But Mr. Zemla must have misunderstood me -- or else I did not express myself clearly -- if he thinks that I said that effective and general control was impossible. I did not say that it would be impossible to apply complete control at the end of disarmament. I said that it would be impossible to apply complete or nearly complete control at the end of the first stage, as implied by the Gromyko proposal. We consider that control must be gradual and that its scope must expand with the progress of disarmament.

In my view there is a contradiction in the Gromyko proposal: namely, that almost complete disarmament cannot be realized without almost complete control, which -- I repeat -- is very difficult to achieve at the end of the first stage. Moreover, I fear that it will be difficult to come to an agreement on any form of control so long as the necessary inspections are regarded as espionage and as violations of a country's security. That attitude must be discarded, and I had hoped that the present improved international atmosphere would have enabled us to do away with -- or, at least, reduce -- these apprehensions.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

In any case, to come back to my argument, I feel that we should examine separately the three types of problem stemming from the Gromyko proposal: maintenance of a balance, control, organization of peace. That would be a constructive work plan; but I must confess that I see nothing constructive in going on repeating that the West wants to keep some missiles and maintain a nuclear threat. Such remarks are absolutely pointless and do not in any way represent the Western position. The Western proposition is a concrete one: we must gradually and progressively eliminate all atomic perils, all missiles.

The Soviet delegation expressed, last Tuesday and again today, its concern over a possible increase in the number of missiles. It is quite true that, if no one does anything, the number of missiles may well increase. Any country which rightly or wrongly believes that it has fallen behind in the race will try to catch up with the country that appears to be in front; the latter, in its turn, will try not to be overtaken and will continue to produce missiles. That is the classical arms race, the familiar and deplorable arms spiral. How can we prevent that? We must obviously stop this race at once, and prevent an aggravation of this spiral.

But that is not the sum total of our proposals. We also propose a 30 per cent reduction in all nuclear devices without exception, to be carried out over a period of three years. That proposal was put forward by the West two years ago. If it had been accepted then, there would now be many fewer missiles in the world and the situation would be much better than it is now.

In any case, what are the objections to the percentage system? I must say that I have not heard any convincing ones. The percentage method is accepted by the Eastern delegations for conventional weapons and has been proposed for military budgets. Why reject it solely for nuclear weapons?

Those are our proposals; they are very clear. They were set forth this morning systematically and clearly by the United States representative, Mr. Fisher, who at the same time made a profound and very valuable analysis of Mr. Gromyko's proposal.

As I see it, we must, without pessimism or impatience, continue to compare both sides' proposals in the light of the Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations (ENDC/5), concentrating step by step on each individual problem: maintenance of balance, control, and peaceful organization of the world. Those are not problems of detail or artificial problems; they are real ones and have been explained to the Committee in our speeches on the Gromyko proposal.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 175th plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the Chairmanship of Mr. Miroslav Zemla, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, representative of Czechoslovakia.

"Statements were made by the representatives of the United States of America, Czechoslovakia, Canada, the USSR and Italy.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 19 March 1964, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 12.30 p.m.